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R. v. SPENCER AND THE AFFIRMATION
OF INTERNET PRIVACY RIGHTS
IN CANADA
Christopher Cornell*
HIS article looks at the Supreme Court of Canada's June 13, 2014
opinion in R. v. Spencer (Spencer) holding that the Canadian pub-
lic enjoys certain privacy rights and expectations in regard to their
use of the Internet.1 It begins by presenting the background information
and lower court rulings that led to this case the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada. Continuing, the article presents an analysis of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Spencer. The last section of the article looks at developments in
the Federal Parliament since Spencer, in particular, legislative proposals
that most likely need to be modified in light of the Supreme Court's
ruling.
I. R. V. SPENCER: BACKGROUND AND
LOWER COURT RULINGS
Before Spencer, police in Canada investigating crimes on the Internet
traditionally would request information about an Internet user suspected
of committing a crime from their internet service provider (ISP) via the
use of general investigative police powers listed in section 487.014 of the
Canadian Criminal Code (Criminal Code) or through requests to an ISP
made via what is known as the "lawful authority exception" in section
7(3)(c.1)(ii) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Docu-
ments Act (PIPEDA). 2 One such criminal case arising from a request
made through the PIPEDA procedure ultimately reached the Supreme
Court and led to the opinion in Spencer.3
*Christopher is a student in his final year of study at the SMU Dedman School of
Law. Prior to beginning law school he earned a Bachelor of Arts from Trinity
University and a Master of Letters from the University of St. Andrews. Christo-
pher would like to thank his family, friends, and professors for their continuing
support of him in his academic endeavors.
1. See R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, para. 62 (Can.).
2. See Roger Watkiss, Canada's Supreme Court Sends Strong Message on Internet
Privacy in R v Spencer, NORTON Rost, FULBRIGHT, (June 2014), http://www.nor
tonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/1 17579/canadas-supreme-court-
sends-strong-message-on-internetprivacy-in-r-v-spencer
3. Spencer, 2014 SCC para. 11.
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A. BACKGROUND
In 2007, police in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, investigating child pornog-
raphy distribution on the Internet, contacted Shaw Communications, a
Canadian ISP-without first obtaining a warrant-and requested that
Shaw hand over information relating to one of their users as part of the
police investigation. This eventually led to the arrest of Matthew Spencer
for child pornography charges.4 On August 31, 2007, then-Constable
(now Detective Sergeant) Darren Parisien, using file sharing software
similar to the LimeWire software program, discovered child pornography
in the shared folder of a computer at the internet protocol address (IP
address) 70.64.12.102. 5 LimeWire and similar software programs function
by allowing individuals to search the Internet for files and then download
them to their own computers where, by default, they are stored in a
shared folder and made available for other users of the software to
download. 6
After finding the IP address, Parisien then used a police database to
determine that the particular address he had detected was assigned to
Shaw Communications for use in Saskatoon.7 Following Parisien's dis-
covery, Saskatoon Police Sergeant Deb Altrogge wrote to Shaw request-
ing information under section 7(3)(c.1)(ii) of PIPEDA as part of an
ongoing child pornography investigation. 8 Shaw complied by providing
the name, address, and other identifying information for the account
holder assigned to the IP address in question, Spencer's sister. 9 Following
Shaw's disclosures, Parisien obtained a warrant to search the residence
listed on the account, where Matthew Spencer also happened to reside. 10
The Saskatoon Police Service executed the warrant and found "441 dis-
tinct images and 112 videos" of graphic child pornography on Spencer's
computer.11 Spencer had used the LimeWire software to download the
child pornography onto his computer.12
B. THE TRIAL COURT
At the time of his arrest, Spencer was eighteen years old and was tried
before Justice Peter Foley of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's
Bench.13 At trial, it was revealed that the summer before his arrest Spen-
4. Sean Fine, Canadians Have Right to Online Anonymity, Supreme Court Rules,
GLOBE AND MAIL, (June 13, 2014, 10:04 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/national/supreme-court-privacy/articleI 9155295/.
5. R. v. Spencer, 2011 SKCA 144, para. 6 (Can. Sask. C.A.).
6. Id. para. 5.
7. Id. para. 6.
8. Id. para. 7.
9. Id. para. 8.
10. Id.
11. Id. para. 9.
12. Id. para. 4.




cer had worked as a children's swimming instructor, though there was no
evidence of him acting against any child. 1 4 Crown Prosecutor, Michael
Segu, however, thought it prudent to ask the court to bar Spencer from
any position of trust or authority with any child under the age of
sixteen.1 5
Spencer was charged with two offenses: possession of child pornogra-
phy and making child pornography available to others through the In-
ternet.1 6 At trial, Segu argued for a nine-month sentence and three years
of probation based on the large quantity of material Spencer had col-
lected and caused to be shared over the Internet for seven months.17
Spencer's attorney, Mark Brayford, argued instead for the minimum
forty-five-day jail sentence and agreed with the three years' probation
requirement.1 8 Segu maintained that the longer sentence would serve as
an appropriate denunciation of Spencer and a deterrent to others who
might commit the same crime, while Brayford argued that the shame he
had brought down on himself and his family should be considered in sen-
tencing. 19 Spencer had admitted that he had sought out to download and
keep the files he had downloaded but claimed that he did not realize he
was sharing the files that he had downloaded.2 0 After weighing all of the
evidence, arguments, and Spencer's claim of not knowing that he was
sharing the files he had downloaded, Justice Foley convicted Spencer on
the charge of possession of child pornography and acquitted him on the
charge of making child pornography available after finding that he did
not have the requisite intent to commit that crime. 2 1 Both Spencer and
the Crown appealed Foley's decision.2
2
C. THE COURT OF APPEAL
1. Spencer's Appeal
On appeal to the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan, the only issue
raised by Spencer was a claim under section 24(2) of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (Charter) that the request from the Saskatoon Po-
lice to Shaw for the IP address information constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter and therefore, the child
pornography files should have been excluded from evidence. 23
At the earlier trial, Justice Foley had dismissed that claim and Spen-
cer's appeal rested on his assertion that the earlier Charter claim should
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. R. v. Spencer, 2009 SKQB 341, para. 1 (Can. Sask. Q.B.).




21. See Spencer, 2011 SKCA para. 10.
22. Id.
23. Id. para. 11.
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not have been dismissed by Foley.2 4 Justice Caldwell, writing for the
court,25 stated that the proper way to evaluate Spencer's claim would be
to "follow the two step inquiry set out in R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, for assessing (1) whether the police conduct consti-
tuted a 'search' within the meaning of §8 of the Charter, and (2) if so,
whether the search was reasonable. '2 6 On the first step, Caldwell held
that nothing in Shaw's services agreement with Spencer's sister or
PIPEDA prevented it from giving what information it did to the police
but rather that under the agreement and PIPEDA, Shaw was expressly
authorized to hand over that information.2 7 Because of this there was a
strong presumption against Spencer having a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information disclosed by Shaw.28 Justice Caldwell then
weighed the reasonableness of the search itself and determined that in
light of the other factors and the minimally intrusive nature of the police
search seeking to trace his IP address, Spencer did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to the information disclosed by
Shaw.
2 9
Caldwell then stated that because Spencer had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the information disclosed by Shaw, it was not necessary
to determine the reasonableness of the police search. 30 Caldwell, how-
ever, opined that even if Spencer had possessed an expectation of pri-
vacy, then the search by the police would have been permissible because
it would have been authorized by a law that was itself reasonable and
because the search that was carried out was reasonable in manner.
31
Therefore, because Spencer had no expectation of privacy, and even if he
had possessed such an expectation, the search carried out was reasonable,
the court dismissed Spencer's appeal of his conviction for possession of
child pornography. 32
2. The Crown's Appeal
The Crown appealed Spencer's acquittal on the charge that he made
child pornography available, arguing that Justice Foley made a mistake
by: (1) finding that Spencer's unintentional allowance of the child por-
nography files to be shared failed to satisfy the mens rea requirement of
the crime; (2) failing to look into whether willful blindness could have
satisfied the mens rea requirement; and (3) "by failing to consider all of
the evidence before him or by misapprehending that evidence." '3 3
24. Id.
25. Id. para. 95.
26. See id. para. 16.
27. Id. para. 42.
28. Id.
29. Id. paras. 44-45.
30. Id. para. 46.
31. Id.
32. Id. para. 47.
33. Id. para. 48.
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The Crown's appeal required the Court of Appeal to answer two ques-
tions. First, it had to determine if Justice Foley erred by concluding that
the mens rea element of the crime under section 163.1(3) of the Criminal
Code means that only one who knowingly made child pornography avail-
able could be guilty.34 Second, it had to determine whether or not some
positive activity on Spencer's part would have been required to prove the
specific intent element of acting knowingly.35 On the first question, Jus-
tice Caldwell held that "the mens rea element of the offence may be met
by sufficient evidence of intention or actual knowledge, recklessness cou-
pled with knowledge of the consequences, or willful blindness, but not
mere negligence," and therefore upheld the trial court's conclusion that
the crime required that the distribution of child pornography be done
knowingly.36 On the second question, Caldwell reversed the trial court
by holding that one knowingly commits the crime of making child por-
nography available by downloading such material through file sharing
programs and then continuing to share the files with others.37 In revers-
ing the trial court, Caldwell stated that there was no positive activity re-
quirement but added that by continuing to share downloaded files of
child pornography, a defendant would in any case have satisfied a posi-
tive activity requirement under the Criminal Code had one existed.38
Caldwell also ruled that the trial court made a substantive error of law by
misconstruing the requirement of knowingly committing the crime, and
further opined that even if the requirement of acting knowingly had not
been satisfied, the Crown only had to prove willful blindness to the file
sharing activity to satisfy the elements of the crime. 39 Caldwell elabo-
rated that by acquitting Spencer of the "making child pornography avail-
able" charge by inaccurately concluding that the knowledge requirement
was unsatisfied, the trial court had failed to take into account evidence of
willful blindness to making child pornography available-which, if
proven, also could have satisfied the knowledge requirement of the
crime. 40 Justice Caldwell therefore granted the Crown's appeal and or-
dered a new trial for Spencer on the charge of making child pornography
available. 4 1 Spencer proceeded to appeal the rulings on both charges by
the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan to the Supreme Court of Canada
and the Court accepted his application for leave to appeal. 42
34. Id. para. 50.
35. Id.
36. Id. paras. 64-65.
37. Id. para. 80.
38. See id. para. 81.
39. Id. para. 93.
40. Id.
41. Id. para. 95.
42. See R. v. Spencer, 417 Sask. R. 323 (Can.).
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II. R. V. SPENCER: THE SUPREME COURT CASE
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada was tasked with answering
four questions: (1) did the police obtaining the subscriber information
from Shaw constitute a search; (2) if it was a search was it authorized by
any law, (3) if there was a search and it was not authorized by a law,
should the evidence obtained be excluded; and (4) did the trial judge
make an error in his ruling on the fault aspect of the charge of making
child pornography available. 43
A. WAS THERE A SEARCH?
Under section 8 of the Charter, Canadians are granted a right to be
secure against unreasonable searches or seizures. 44 The first question
asks the Court to determine if the protection against unreasonable
searches comes into play in regard to the police obtaining the subscriber
account information from Shaw. 45 In order to answer that question, the
Court had to determine if the police request and receipt of that informa-
tion constituted a search under section 8 of the Charter.46 If, in the total-
ity of the circumstances, Spencer had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the information Shaw handed over to the police, then there was a
search. 47
In answering this question, the Court first determined that the police
request was essentially a request to connect a specific person or persons
to specific online activities, and that in this case, the request engaged an
"anonymity aspect" of online usage that the Court had held in other in-
stances to have involved substantial privacy interests. 48 The Court agreed
with the Court of Appeal that Spencer had an expectation of privacy with
respect to the information handed over to the police by Shaw.49 The
Court then determined that under the contractual provisions of the ISP
agreement and PIPEDA, in order for a disclosure request from the police
to be honored, it must have been made with "lawful authority."' 50 Be-
cause under PIPEDA the police could ask the ISP to provide subscriber
information, but not compel them to do so, the police have no "lawful
authority" with regard to making such requests. 51 Thus, through a weigh-
ing of the totality of the circumstances, including the relevant contractual
and statutory provisions, the Court determined that a request from the
police to an ISP to voluntarily disclose subscriber information constitutes
a search. 52
43. See Spencer, 2014 SCC para. 5.
44. Id. para. 15.
45. Id. para. 16.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. para. 50.
49. Id. para. 51.
50. See id. para. 65.
51. See id.
52. See id. paras. 65-66.
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B. WAS THE SEARCH AUTHORIZED BY LAW?
In this case, the search carried out by the police (i.e., the police request
for subscriber information from the ISP) was warrantless, and warrantless
searches are presumed to be unreasonable and the burden of rebutting
the presumption falls on the Crown. 53 For such a search to be reasonable
it must: (1) be authorized by law; (2) the authorizing law must be reason-
able; and (3) the search must be carried out reasonably. 54 As Spencer did
not challenge the constitutionality of the laws alleged to have authorized
the search, and the Court considered his contentions about the reasona-
bleness of how the search was carried out to be groundless, the Court
only had to determine if the search was authorized by law.55 After ana-
lyzing section 487.014 of the Criminal Code and section 7(3)(c.1)(ii) of
PIPEDA, the Court determined that neither grants search and seizure
powers to the police; therefore, the police search of the subscriber infor-
mation was unlawful. 56 The Court also explained that it then follows that
because the police could not have obtained a warrant to search Spencer's
residence without the earlier unlawful search information, that the search
of the residence unlawfully violated the Charter.57 The Court also
stressed that nothing in its ruling prevented the police from obtaining
information without a warrant if the information were immediately re-
quired in emergency situations, such as to prevent imminent bodily harm;
while also stressing that in this case, there was no such emergency. 58
C. BECAUSE THE SEARCH WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY A LAW,
SHOULD THE EVIDENCE BE EXCLUDED?
Because there was evidence obtained in violation of the Defendant's
Charter rights, the Court had to determine under section 24(2) of the
Charter whether or not allowing the use of the illegally obtained "evi-
dence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. ' 59 The
Court applied its own test from R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, to deter-
mine whether or not the evidence would be allowed or should be ex-
cluded under section 24(2) of the Charter. 60 The Grant test requires that
the Court weigh and balance the effects of allowing the use of the illegally
obtained evidence on society's confidence in the administration of justice
by considering: (1) the seriousness of the Charter violation, (2) the impact
of the violation of the Charter rights of the defendant, and (3) society's
interest in the case being decided on its own merits. 61 With regard to the
seriousness of the Charter violation, the Court determined that because
53. Id. para. 68.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. paras. 71, 74.
57. Id. para. 74.
58. Id.
59. Id. para. 75.
60. Id. para. 76.
61. Id.
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the police believed that their request to Shaw was authorized by law and
both the trial and appeals courts shared that belief, it was reasonable for
the police to think that they were acting lawfully to carry out a law en-
forcement action.62 The Court further determined that the police con-
duct in this instance would not bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. 63 With regard to the impact of the violation of Spencer's
rights, the Court determined that the impact was serious because ano-
nymity is an important privacy safeguard for people online and exposure
of his anonymity subjected Spencer to police action, stating that this fac-
tor "weighs in favor of excluding the evidence."' 64 On the third prong of
the Grant test, the Court stated that "[s]ociety undoubtedly has an inter-
est in seeing a full and fair trial based on reliable evidence, and all the
more so for a crime which implicates the safety of children. ' 65 The Court
also noted that without the child pornography evidence, the Crown would
have no case, and that the defense at trial had owned up to the existence
of the child pornography evidence.66 After weighing the three factors of
the Grant test, the court determined that the exclusion of the evidence
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and thus upheld
its admission at trial.67
D. DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ERR BY ACQUITTING ON THE CHARGE OF
MAKING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AVAILABLE?
When it came to the issue of whether the trial judge erred in his ruling
as to the necessity of a positive act on Spencer's part to secure a convic-
tion for the crime of making child pornography available, the Court
agreed with the Court of Appeal's analysis of the issue. 68 The Court
ruled that whether Spencer was willfully blind to his file sharing was a
pertinent issue at trial, and that the trial judge's error in ruling that a
positive act is a requirement of the mens rea of the crime led to the willful
blindness issue not being addressed at trial. 69 Because of the trial judge's
error, the Court upheld the Court of Appeal's order that a new trial be
held on the charge of making child pornography available.70
The Court also dismissed Spencer's appeal and affirmed his conviction
for possession of child pornography. 71 Those actions would appear to
have been assured by the upholding of the admission of the evidence ear-
lier in the opinion.72 There were five noticeable practical effects of the
Court's ruling in Spencer, the first of these being that the police (and by
62. Id. para. 77.
63. Id.
64. Id. para. 78.
65. Id. para. 80.
66. Id.
67. Id. para. 81.
68. Id. para. 82.
69. Id. para. 86.
70. Id. para. 87.
71. Id.
72. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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implication, the Government) need a warrant to obtain personally identi-
fiable subscriber information relating to the activities of Canadians on the
Internet. 73 Second, in an emergency situation, the police can still demand
that information necessary to resolve the emergency be handed over
without a warrant.7 4 Third, the internet privacy right outlined by the
Court does not give criminals freedom to act with impunity, rather, it just
requires that police investigators take the extra step of obtaining a war-
rant from a judge before requesting information from an ISP. Further
the typical ISP will likely have an uptick in the number of warrants it has
to process.7 5 Fourth, while Spencer was a child pornography case, the
ruling that mandates the obtaining of warrants applies to all cases where
the police seek identifying information about Canadian's online activi-
ties.7 6 Lastly, for any cases pending when the Spencer ruling was issued,
where the police had acted in good faith based on a belief that a warrant
was not necessary to obtain subscriber information from an internet
user's ISP, the prosecution can continue while the warrant requirement
will apply to all future cases. 77
III. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
SINCE R. V. SPENCER
Prior to the Court's ruling in Spencer, the Canadian Government intro-
duced into both chambers of Parliament two pieces of legislation ostensi-
bly designed to offer Canadians enhanced online privacy and crime
protections.78
The first of these, House of Commons Bill C-13, the proposed Protect-
ing Canadians from Online Crime Act, would criminalize the non-con-
sensual online posting of pictures of an intimate nature while
simultaneously granting police several new enforcement powers. 79 In
terms of the Spencer ruling, at least one clause in Bill C-13, which pur-
ports to give companies (such as telecom operators) that voluntarily sur-
render subscriber information to the police immunity from suit, has been
described by Canada's new Privacy Commissioner, Daniel Therrien, as
"essentially meaningless" in light of Spencer.8 0 In Parliament, Bill C-13
73. See David Butt, Five Ways the Supreme Court Ruling Affects Online Privacy,







78. See Josh Wingrove, How New Laws Are About To Change Your Privacy, GLOBE
AND MAIL, (June 9, 2014, 5:51 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/polit
ics/how-new-laws-are-about-to-change-your-privacy/article19054653/.
79. Id.
80. See Josh Wingrove, Conservatives Must Review Privacy Bills After Top Court's
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languished for months in committee at the House of Commons commit-
tee for some time with no new actions being taken on it since the day
after the Spencer ruling came down, before clearing the Commons on
October 20, 2014, being introduced to the Senate the next day, clearing
the Senate on December 4, 2014, and signed into law by the Governor
General on December 9, 2014.81 Notably, Bill C-13 was passed and
signed into law despite Therrien's continued misgivings82 and consistent
calls for increased privacy protections to be added to the legislation. 83
The second piece of legislation, Senate Bill S-4, the proposed Digital
Privacy Act, would allow companies in certain situations to share data
about their users with other companies without disclosing the sharing to
anyone whose data is being shared.8 4 While this corporate sharing has
some investigatory potential on top of that already afforded by the Bill C-
13 police data sharing provision, it also raises significant privacy concerns
about what data corporations might share and how they would use it.85
These concerns, however, did not stop the Senate from passing Bill S-4 on
June 16, 2014 (after Spencer) and sending it to the House of Commons.86
Bill S-4 was introduced into the Commons on June 17, 2014, and referred
to committee on October 20, 2014.87
After Spencer, Therrien called on the Government to review, and pos-
sibly revise, Bills S-4 and C-13 because they both contain clauses allowing
internet user subscriber data to be shared without a warrant in certain
circumstances; actions that in light of Spencer would likely be
unconstitutional. 88
IV. CONCLUSION
At its core, Spencer stands for the principal that before an individual's
privacy rights may be sacrificed by the disclosure or monitoring of their
personally identifiable information over the Internet, no matter how no-
ble or significant the investigation, the rights of those under investigation
dictate that a judge must issue a warrant to authorize the internet moni-
81. House Government Bill C-13, LEGISinfo, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Legislnfo/
BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&Mode=l&Bill=C13&Parl=41&Ses=2 (last visited
Jan. 26, 2015).
82. See Laura Payton, Cyberbullying Bill Raises Alarm for Privacy Commissioner,
CBC NEws, (Nov. 20, 2014, 5:01 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyberbully
ing-bill-raises-alarm-for-privacy-commissioner-.2842034.
83. See Kady O'Malley, Cyberbullying, Prostitution Bills Among the Few to Make it to
Finish Line, CBC NEWS, (Dec. 17, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/polit
ics/cyberbullying-prostitution-bills-among-the-few-to-make-it-to-finish-ine-.2873
823.
84. See Wingrove, supra note 78.
85. See id.
86. Senate Government Bill S-4, LEGISinfo, http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/Bil]De
tails.aspx?Language=E&Mode=l&BiI=S4&Parl=41&Ses=2 (last visited Jan. 26,
2015).
87. Id.
88. See Wingrove, supra note 80.
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toring and gathering of evidence on the suspect. 89 Through its Spencer
ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada has carefully balanced the constitu-
tional Charter rights of those under investigation against the police duty
to investigate crime. The Court has struck a sensible balance where cases
believed to be constitutional and already in the judicial system at the time
of the decision may continue unabated, and where new investigations by
the police into Charter-protected identifying information will only pass
constitutional muster if accomplished through the use of a warrant issued
by a judge.
89. See Butt, supra note 73.
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